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INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA") in an attempt to pull Puerto Rico
back from the abyss.' The reason for this drastic action-a special
insolvency regime available only for Puerto Rico-was plain: the
Commonwealth had accumulated debts well beyond its ability to repay. Its
economy was in such a dreadful state that even if one were to declare an
indefinite moratorium on all of its debt payments, it would still be the case
that the island could not make ends meet without a drastic overhaul of both
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J. Thomas McCarthy Trustee Chair in Law and Political Science, USC Gould School of Law.
The authors thank Douglas Baird, Joseph Blocher, Rebecca Brown, Sam Erman, and David Skeel for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Tobias Rushing for his excellent research
assistance.
1. See Stephen A. Nufio, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC
NEWS (June 29, 2016, 8:33 P.M.), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-actpuerto-rico-debt-crisis-n601291. See also Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability
Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 29, and 48 U.S.C.).
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its operations and its finances. 2 Yet prior to congressional action there was
no moratorium. The island's creditors were demanding money, and the
government's cash reserves were nearing depletion. Disaster seemed
imminent.3
Congress provided a glimmer of hope to the American citizens of
Puerto Rico. PROMESA, at least temporarily, put a halt to the creditors'
collection efforts. It also created a proceeding that in essence replicates
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code for the Commonwealth, as well as an
alternative path relying on consensual restructuring coupled with the power
to bind holdout creditors. 4 Puerto Rico gained two options that it lacked
prior to the legislation's passage. But the price for these protections was
steep. A control board was put in place that effectively took over control of
5
the territory's finances and the conduct of any insolvency proceedings.
The members of this board were appointed by elected officials in
Washington. 6 The elected government of Puerto Rico had no right to
appoint or veto any members. Given potential constitutional infirmities
with the control board, it remains to be seen whether this last-minute action
is sufficient to save the island from total financial collapse.7

For analyses of Puerto Rico's fiscal and operational problems, see generally Robert K.
2.
Rasmussen, Puerto Rico: Of Capital Structures, Control Rights and Liquidity, 11 CAP. MARKETS L.J.
228 (2016); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, RANJIT TEJA & ANDREW WOLFE, PUERTO RICO-A WAY FORWARD
(2015), http://www.bgfpr.com/documents/PuertoRicoAWayForward.pdf.
3.
For an account of the evolution of the crisis, leading up to and including the passage of

PROMESA, see Mary Williams Walsh, How Puerto Rico Is Grappling with a Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ro6b37.
4.
Title III of PROMESA contains a judicially supervised restructuring mechanism, similar in
many ways to Chapter 9. See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act,
§§ 301-317. Title VI, in contrast, in effect inserts collective action clauses into Puerto Rico's sovereign
bonds. See id §§ 401-413. The granting of choice of which path to proceed under echoes the debates in
the sovereign debt literature over whether sovereign distress is better handled through a sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism or collective action clauses placed in the debt instruments. Compare ANNE 0.
KRUEGER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 4-10
(2002), with John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y of Treasury for Int'l Aff., Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
US Perspective, Speech at the Conference "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards," Institute
for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/ papers/TaylorO4O2.htm.
5.
Jackie Calmes, Puerto Rico Relief Measure Clears Senate, Goes to Obama, N.Y. TIMES

(June 29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2ohliaH.
Creditor groups, seeking to enhance their chances for recovery on the bonds that they
6.
purchased, have argued that this method of filling the board violates the Appointments Clause. See
Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico's Colonial Status Hinges on a New York Hedge Fund's
Greed, HILL (Nov. 25, 2017, 10:00 A.M.), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/361775-puerto-ricoscolonial-status-hinges-on-a-new-york-hedge-funds-greed; Mary Williams Walsh, Hedge Fund Sues to
Have Puerto Rico's Bankruptcy Case Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2uAgQc4.
7.
See Blocher & Gualti, supra note 6.
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We here are interested in a different type of abyss than the one that
spurred Congress to act. Prior to the passage and signing of PROMESA,
Puerto Rico inhabited a netherworld of debt adjustment. In Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Bankruptcy Code provided no relief for Puerto Rico or its municipalities
and at the same time precluded Puerto Rico from enacting an insolvency
regime of its own.8 The Commonwealth could neither repair to federal law
to restructure some of the debts plaguing it nor could it enact legislation to
address the fiscal crisis. In essence, Puerto Rico was faced with crushing
debt and no mechanism to take action, other than attempts to have
bondholders voluntarily agree to haircuts (something that bondholders are
loath to do). Puerto Rico gamely undertook such efforts for some of its
debt, but while these attempts may have shown glimmers of optimism to
some, each of them eventually fell apart. 9 Not a single group of creditors
was willing to restructure its debt to a sustainable level. Puerto Rico was in
fiscal purgatory.
While the issue was not before the Supreme Court in Franklin, we
want to explore whether the Constitution allows Congress to put Puerto
Rico into such a bind. Can it take away a government's power to enact a
restructuring regime and put nothing in its place? Put in contractual terms,
do the implicit terms of the deal struck between Puerto Rico and the U.S.
federal government when Puerto Rico transitioned from the status of a
colony to a "freely associated state" in 195210 allow Congress to eliminate
in full Puerto Rico's ability to restructure the debt of its municipalities?
This question encompasses both the situation that existed in Puerto Rico
prior to the enactment of PROMESA and the potential lacuna that could
arise should a state enact a restructuring law for its own debts and Congress

8.

Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1948-49 (2016).

9.

See, e.g., Michael Corkery, Let Us Help You, Hedge Funds Tell Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES:

DEALBOOK (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:05 A.M.), https://nyti.ms/2m4CqBU; Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto
Rico Postpones Debt Plan, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 30, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2hHzAGd.
10.
See Chimbne I. Keitner, From Conquest to Consent: Puerto Rico and the Prospect of
Genuine Free Association, in RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN EMPIRE 77, 87-89 (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015). Some skeptics
view Puerto Rico as still being essentially in a colonial vassal state, where Congress rules by fiat. See
Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Debt Relief Law Stirs Colonial Resentment, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (June 30, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jNQLSk. But such a status would be fundamentally
inconsistent with the modern state of international law, which no longer countenances empires and
colonies. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215,
225-26 & n.60 (2017); Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right ofAccession, YALE J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=

2988102.
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seek to void such action. 1 We submit that the answer is no.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. In the first, we describe the
financial situation facing Puerto Rico, its attempts to address that situation,
and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Franklin. This articulation of
the problem highlights the ills that can occur when a sovereign entity has
the power to issue debt but lacks a means for resolving financial distress.
We then ask the question of whether, when it comes to states, the allocation
of authority between them and the federal government would allow
Congress to put them in such an untenable situation. States under our
federal system retain core functions. The power to issue and restructure
debts, we submit, resides in this core. Indeed, prior Supreme Court
precedent holds that the power to issue debt necessarily includes the power
to create a mechanism for restructuring that debt. We argue that while
Congress can adjust this power by replacing a state's scheme with one of
its own, it cannot, consistent with federalism, prohibit state action while
putting nothing in its place.
We then turn our attention to Puerto Rico. The much-vilified Insular
Cases seem to imply that Congress has substantial leeway in all matters
regarding Puerto Rico. 12 We show, however, that the colonial conception
of the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. federal government,
on which those cases rest, cannot form the basis for determining what the
allocation of authority between Congress and Puerto Rico is today.
Congress transferred sovereignty to Puerto Rico. It established and
implemented a process by which the island became a commonwealth. As
part of that transfer of sovereignty-something that was done in the postSecond World War era, when colonial outposts were to be phased out as a
matter of the new international order-Congress authorized and then
approved Puerto Rico's constitution, which expressly gave the Puerto
Rican government the power to issue debt and impose taxes. 13 This action,
11.

For an argument, which we endorse, that Congress can enact a restructuring regimes for

states, see generally David A. Skeel, Jr., States ofBankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 677 (2012).
12. The canonical Insular Cases comprise Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); and De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). See Juan R. Torruella, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Puerto Rico's
American Solitude, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, THE AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND

THE CONSTITUTION 241, 248 n.14 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
13.
For details, see Keitner, supra note 10, at 87-90. Some would argue further that to treat
Puerto Rico's relationship to the rest of the United States through the lens of the Insular Cases (where
Puerto Rico was explicitly conceptualized as U.S. "property") would also arguably violate the United
States' international law obligations. See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment

of a Regime of PoliticalApartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 283, 293, 332-34 (2007) (emphasizing, in
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we submit, necessarily also gave Puerto Rico the power to enact a
restructuring regime. Congress could negate Puerto Rico's right to put in
place a restructuring regime, but only if it were to put in place some
substitute mechanism. Prohibiting the enactment of any means of
restructuring its obligations cannot pass constitutional muster.
I. THE PUERTO RICAN FISCAL CRISIS AND THE
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTEMPT AT SELF-HELP
That Puerto Rico is facing a deep fiscal crisis is beyond doubt. Its
problem consists both of the amount of debt that it owes and the varying
and vague priorities among its various debt instruments. Unlike recently
distressed sovereigns such as Greece and Argentina, which largely issued
only one type of debt-unsecured sovereign bonds-Puerto Rico and its
various instrumentalities issued many types of debt. 14 Some of the debt
came from various government agencies, such as the power company, the
highway agency, and the water company. Some of this debt was guaranteed
by the main government; some was not. The main government itself issued
multiple flavors of obligations, with the relative priority of the various
issues a current matter of dispute among the debt holders.15 When the
bonds issued by the general government are added to the debt incurred by
the various agencies, the total exceeds $70 billion. 1 6 This sum does not
include Puerto Rico's unfunded pension obligations that it has promised to
its employees. Throwing these promises to pay into the mix brings the total
indebtedness to well over $100 billion.17
The amount of Puerto Rico's debt is only half of the analysis. A

particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that the United States became a

party to in 1992).
There were differences among the Greek and Argentine sovereign bonds too, in that a small
14.
subset of Greek bonds were guaranteed by the state, and both Argentina and Greece had bonds
governed by the laws of different jurisdictions (e.g., local, England, New York, Japan). However, the
variation paled in comparison to what Puerto Rico had on offer. For details on the Greek and Argentine
debts and their restructurings, see generally Juan J. Cruces & Tim R. Samples, Settling Sovereign
Debt's "Trial of the Century," 31 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 5 (2016); Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The
Greek Debt Restructuring. An Autopsy, 28 ECON. POL'Y 513 (2013).
The holders of general obligation bonds assert that they have first priority to the revenues of
15.
the Commonwealth by virtue of Puerto Rico's Constitution. See Complaint at 2-3, Jacana Holdings v.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 1:16-cv-04702 (S.D.N.Y.

June 21, 2016). The holders of

CONFINA bonds, however, also argue that they have first dibs on half of the sales tax collected by the
government.
1 6.
See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Debt Alone Won't Crush Puerto Rico. Depopulation is the Curse.,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2017, 7:00 A.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-06/debtalone-won-t-crush-puerto-rico-depopulation-is-the-curse.

17.

See id.
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government's debt load can only be viewed as unsustainable when it is
compared to its ability to raise funds through taxation. Sovereigns with
larger economies can support larger debt loads. When we compare Puerto
Rico's debt load with its prospects for generating future revenues, the
results are bleak. Puerto Rico's economy has little hope of servicing its
extant debt stock. The island's population is only around 3.4 million
people.18 Its gross domestic product for 2013 was $103 billion, which is
roughly the same as, and indeed could well be less than, its debt obligations
(with unfunded pension liabilities included). 19 Yet it is even worse than this
snapshot indicates. The Commonwealth's debt load and its GDP are
moving in opposite directions. 2 0 The island's debt has been ballooning for
years. Its economy, on the other hand, has been in decline for over a
decade.21 Many of the island's citizens have decamped for the mainland.
Indeed, Puerto Rico is losing population at an alarming rate. 22 The gap
between what Puerto Rico owes and what it can pay grows with each
passing year.
The recent devastation wrought by Hurricane Maria has made things
worse. The hurricane devastated the local economy and caused tens of
thousands of Puerto Rico's citizens to flee to the continental United
States. 23 The lawyers representing the PROMESA board have estimated
that the government will not be able to make any payments on its debt for
at least five years. 24
The Commonwealth's looming inability to meet its obligations has not
gone unnoticed. Puerto Rico has spent the last few years looking for a

18.
Patti Domm, PuertoRico's New Worry Is a PopulationFlight to the US Mainlandthat Could
Slow Its Recovery, CNBC (Sept. 28, 2017, 7:53 P.M.), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/ 28/puerto-ricospopulation-flight-could-slow-its-recovery.html.
19.
Puerto Rico, WORLD BANK: DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/country/puerto-rico (last

visited Nov. 13, 2017).
20.
See KRUEGER ET AL., supra note 2, at 24-25.
21.
Id. at 3-4.
22.
See Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico's Drastic Population Loss Deepens Its Economic Crisis,
WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016, 7:35 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricos-drastic-populationloss-deepens-its-economic-crisis-1467219467.
23.
See Ana Campoy, Blown Away: Puerto Rico Is Set to Become the World's Worst Economy
Next Year, QUARTZ (Nov. 23, 2017), https://qz.com/1 137351 (noting that thousands of businesses have
not reopened two months after the hurricane and that over 100,000 people have left the island). In
theory, Congress could enact disaster relief sufficient to allow Puerto Rico to rebuild its economy.
Given the structural relationship that we describe in this piece, we are skeptical that aid at such a level
will be forthcoming.
24.
Steven Church & Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico May Need to Skip Bond Payments for Five
Years, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:43 A.M.), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-1115/puerto-rico-considering-suspending-debt-payments-for-five-years.
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mechanism by which it can address its financial distress. Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which allows a state to authorize its municipal units to
file for restructuring, was not an option. 25 To be sure, even had Puerto Rico
been able to use Chapter 9 for its municipal entities, this would have not
provided a comprehensive solution to the island's debt as it would not have
offered a vehicle to restructure the debt issued by the Commonwealth itself.
Chapter 9 is currently not available to the states, only to a state's
municipalities. 26 Still, access to Chapter 9 would have allowed Puerto Rico
to ameliorate the debt problem. Yet even such partial relief was not
available.
When the predecessor to Chapter 9 was enacted, Puerto Rico was
treated the same as a state and thus had the ability to authorize its
municipalities to seek shelter in its provisions. 27 When Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Puerto Rico maintained its ability to use Chapter
9's provisions to restructure the debts of its municipalities. 28 Had that
provision remained in place, Puerto Rico could have attempted to
restructure the debt of its various agencies. In 1984, however, without
comment or explanation, Congress, led by Senator Strom Thurmond of
South Carolina, removed Puerto Rico's access to Chapter 9.29
Attempting to deal with its financial predicament, Puerto Rico enacted
the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act in
2014.30 This Act contained a debt restructuring mechanism that drew its
inspiration from Chapter 9. Chapter 9 allows for the instrumentalities of
states, but not states themselves, to restructure their debts. Prior to its
exclusion from Chapter 9, the same arrangement was available for Puerto
Rico-it could place its instrumentalities into bankruptcy, but it could not
use the provision for debts that it had issued. The law that Puerto Rico
enacted followed this course; it would only be available to instrumentalities
of the territory and not the territory itself. Puerto Rico in essence tried to
25.
26.
27.

See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
See id.
See II U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (omitted 1976).

28.

See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J.

553, 572-73 (2014).
29. Id. at 573-74. See also Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, tit. III,
sec. 421, § 101, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 369 ("'State' includes the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title");
Michal Kranz, Here's How Puerto Rico Got into So Much Debt, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:20
P.M.), http://www.businessinsider.com/puerto-rico-debt-2017-1 0.
30.
2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71. For discussion, see Recent Legislation, Puerto Rico Public
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARv. L. REV.

1320, 1320-27 (2015).
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restore what Congress had taken away.
Not so fast, claimed the holders of debt issued by Puerto Rico's public
corporations. Chapter 9, they argued, contains a provision that preempts
state restructuring regimes (and "states" in this case, according to the way
the term had been defined, included Puerto Rico). 3 1 The most relevant case
in interpreting the predecessor of Chapter 9 was a famous wartime decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury
32
Park.
At issue was a law passed by New Jersey to enable its
municipalities to restructure their debts with the approval of 85% of their
creditors (and judicial supervision and approval). 3 3 A subset of creditors,
who were unwilling to allow the municipality to restructure its debts, sued,
arguing that New Jersey was not entitled to take such an action.3 4 The
Court in Asbury Park upheld the New Jersey statute, ruling that the states'
police power includes the ability to enact debt restructuring regimes for
their municipalities. 35 To be sure, the Court said, the regimes could not run
afoul of the Contracts Clause-in other words, the states could not put in
place regimes that were aimed at simply expropriating value from investors
and transferring that to the state. 36 However, so long as the regime that a
state enacted respected this limit, the Court said, it could put a debt
arrangement procedure in place. 37
Asbury Park thus left municipalities with two options: they could
restructure either under federal bankruptcy law or under an appropriately
enacted state law. Congress did not approve of having to share the field
with the states. To the extent states wanted to allow their municipalities to
have the option of restructuring their debts, Congress wanted to specify a
uniform mechanism across the country. Reacting to Asbury Park, Congress
decided that Chapter IX38 was to be the only game in town. It placed in
Chapter IX a new provision, expressly preempting state restructuring
laws. 39 The price for having access to Chapter IX was that states could not
set up alternative restructuring arrangements. The states could choose to
not have a bankruptcy system for their municipalities, but if they chose to
have one, it would be the uniform mechanism that Congress had designed.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2012).
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
Id. at 502-03.
Id at 507.
Id at 513-16.
Id at 512-13.
Id. at 513-16.

38.

At the time, bankruptcy chapters were denominated with Roman numerals.

39.

See 11 U.S.C.

§ 903(1)

(2012).
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That tradeoff continues to this day. No one disputes that Illinois, or any
other state for that matter, cannot enact its own debt restructuring regime
for its municipalities. The holders of Puerto Rican debt argued that this
provision preempts the Puerto Rican effort on this score as well.40
Puerto Rico's response to the argument from the creditors was that,
when Congress took away Puerto Rico's access to Chapter 9, it also took
Puerto Rico out of the ambit of Chapter 9's preemption provision. 41 In
other words, preempting a state's bankruptcy law for purposes of ensuring
a uniform municipal bankruptcy system around the country was fine, but
only if the federal government was going to put something in its place
(which is what Congress did for the states). Absent any federal mechanism
to substitute for a state mechanism, the state (or state-type entity) was
allowed to substitute its own mechanism-that seemed to be the clear
teaching of Asbury Park.
A divided Supreme Court disagreed with this reading of the
Bankruptcy Code and, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, struck down
Puerto Rico's efforts to put in place its own municipal bankruptcy
system. 42 The Court sided with the lenders and held that Chapter 9
preempted Puerto Rico's restructuring law. 43 The effect of this ruling was
to leave Puerto Rico with no federal law to help it restructure its debts and
the inability to pass such a law on its own. It found itself in a position
where it could take no action to address the existential financial challenge
that it faced. Any future attempts to repair Puerto Rico's unsustainable debt
stock could only come through congressional action.
II. THE POWER OF STATES TO ENACT RESTRUCTURING
REGIMES
Before examining the situation that Congress created when it left
Puerto Rico in the netherworld of debt restructuring, we begin our analysis
with the question of whether Congress could do the same thing to a state.
As a starting point, one might think, if Congress could constitutionally
enact such a law for the fifty states, it surely could do so for Puerto Rico.
Puerto Rico may have fewer protections against incursions from Congress
than the states do, but, at least as an initial matter, one would think that it
40. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir. 2015), aff'd, 136
S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
41. Franklin, 136 S. Ct. at 1946.
Id. at 1949. Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas used textualism in reaching this result. See id.
42.
at 1946 ("The plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis.").

43.

Id. at 1949.
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does not have more.44
To begin, consider the following hypothetical. Congress, in order to
promote efficiency and lessen the burden on interstate commerce caused by
fires, creates a national fire department, and, in order to prevent needless
duplication of effort, forbids the states and their instrumentalities from
creating their own fire units. Assume that at least one state is fond of its
own fire departments and seeks to have the new law struck down as
transgressing the limits on federal interference with state authority. To
determine whether the new law would comport with constitutional
limitations on congressional inroads on state regulation of the state's
internal affairs, it is necessary to delve into the Supreme Court's federalism
cases.
At one time, the Court used to strike down with some regularity
regulations that interfered with a state's "traditional" functions. Our
hypothetical law would have likely been found to be unconstitutional under
this analysis, as establishing a fire department has been a function of states
and their municipalities for decades. The Court, however, in Garciav. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, abandoned

the

project

of

demarcating which government functions were "traditional" and hence
subject to constitutional protection. 45
The Court later made clear, in New York v. United States, that Garcia

addressed federal laws that applied to states and private actors alike. 46
When the federal government regulates the states as states, a different
analysis now takes hold. The federal government is allowed, within limits,
to encourage states to take actions-for example, setting speed limits below
seventy miles per hour on interstate highways within a state-through
financial incentives. 47 Alternatively, the federal government can regulate
the activity itself and forbid the state from regulating through preemption.
What it cannot do, however, is require that the states regulate in a
prescribed manner.
44.
We argue infra in Part III that one can articulate a reason for greater protection for Puerto
Rico from congressional intervention, though the position that we put forward in this article does not
hinge on this argument.

45.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We therefore

now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or
'traditional."').

46. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
47. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1987). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580-82 (2012) (holding that Congress went too far with its incentives when it
went from encouragement to compulsion).
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Based on this framework, it seems that Congress's creation of a
national fire department would be upheld. To be sure, Congress could not
take over the extant local fire departments and run them-that would be
commandeering and would run afoul of New York. 48 Having established a
national fire force, however, Congress could then preempt all local efforts
in this space. The federal government can bar duplication of effort.
But what if Congress passed a law that did not create a national fire
department, but rather, seeking to spur the development of privately owned
fire departments, Congress simply forbade states and municipalities from
creating their own? Congress, in our hypothetical, has determined that the
private market is the best way to provide for efficient fire protection. The
Supreme Court has not addressed such a situation. Here, Congress is
regulating the state as a state and is ousting the state from a traditional state
power. It is not, however, putting a federal scheme in its place.
Such a law, we submit, would be unconstitutional. The Court is
clearly worried more about the relationship between the federal and state
governments when Congress attempts to regulate the states qua states. The
Court in New York distinguished Garcia and its predecessors on precisely
this ground. 49 The Court got back into the Tenth Amendment game in New
York because the federal government was attempting to regulate the states
as states. Thus, while Garcia abandons the project of articulating
traditional state functions as to regulations that apply to a range of private
and public parties, it would be over-reading that case to suggest that the
Court would not act to protect core government functions when Congress
seeks to divest them from the state yet put nothing in their place.
To be sure, Congress can exercise its power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate this space for itself, but it would violate basic federalism
principles were it to remove this area from the states and leave nothing in
its place.5 0 Put differently, the implicit deal among the states to delegate
certain powers to a central government and maintain others for themselves
is violated when the central government takes away the power of the state
to protect its citizens in certain ways without stepping in to do the job itself.
The rationale for allowing Congress to step in here is that there are going to

48.
49.

New York, 505 U.S. at 160, 175.
Id. at 160.

50.
Of course, there are times when federal power restricts state power, even if there is nothing
put in place. The clearest example is the Dormant Commerce Clause. There, states are prevented from
enacting laws even though there is no conflict with federal action. In such a setting, however, there is no
interference with a core state function. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance ofFederalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 570.
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be some instances where the assumption that regulation is best designed
and applied at the local level does not hold. In economic terms, these are
the contexts where domestic regulation of an activity by the individual
states will either under- or over-produce the levels of that activity in a way
that causes harm to the system: negative externalities, in economic
parlance. Here it serves the interests of everyone to have the regulation
centralized.5 ' Congress would be within its zone of power if it were to
conclude that local control of firefighting efforts has produced too little
protection for the nation's citizens, and thus central regulation is preferable.
It cannot, however, prevent the state from fulfilling a core function and fail
to provide an alternative.
The same analysis applies in the area of debt restructuring regimes.
We begin with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of municipal
bankruptcies. Originally, the Court struck down Congress's first attempt to
enact a bankruptcy regime for municipalities, stating a concern that the
provision at issue intruded too much on a state's sovereignty.5 2 In United
States v. Bekins, though, the Court upheld a new federal effort,53 pointing
to the fact that under the revised Chapter IX only a "voluntary" petition
could be filed.54 In other words, the state's municipalities could not be
hauled into court over their objections. That the state had consented to have
its municipalities subject to the federal regime was sufficient for the Court
to quiet earlier concerns that the law intruded too much on state
prerogatives. So long as the states themselves could choose to authorize
their municipalities to file for bankruptcy under Chapter IX, the new
regime did not run afoul of the Constitution.55
For our purposes, the most important case is the next in the lineage,
Asbury Park. In that case, as described earlier, New Jersey had enacted a

51.
For the basic economic logic, see generally Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Economics of Federalism, in 3 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PUBLIC LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 84 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2016).

52.
53.

Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 530-32 (1936).
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 50-54 (1938). While the Court treated the new regime

as different from the one it struck down, today most commentators view the two regimes as virtually
identical. The reason for the difference in outcome is now attributed to the Court's famous "switch in
time." See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALEL.J. 1150, 1174, 1175 n.108 (2016).
Bekins, 304 U.S. at 38-39. This requirement existed in the prior law as well. Indeed, most
54.
commentators find few if any significant differences in the law that the Court struck down in Ashton
and the one that it upheld in Bekins. See Gillette & Skeel, supranote 53, at I175-76.
Some have said that similar concerns would render congressional efforts to enact a debt
55.
adjustment law for states unconstitutional. For an argument to the contrary, see Skeel, supra note I1, at

707-11.
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restructuring regime for its municipalities. The city of Asbury Park,
hopelessly insolvent, sought to take advantage of this state-provided
provision that allowed for a restructuring of its debt with the approval of
85% of the holders in principal amount. A subset of unhappy debtholders
invoked the Court's preemption jurisprudence. They argued that when
Congress enacted the regime that was validated in Bekins, it occupied the
field and left no room for a state to enact its own restructuring regime.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, turned back
the challenge. The Court held that the power to enact a restructuring regime
is part and parcel of the power to tax and to issue debt in the first instance.
The insight here is that issuing debt necessarily creates the risk that the
municipality will issue more debt than it can service. It is not that the
municipality is necessarily feckless when it defaults; rather, unforeseen
events can well create a situation where the municipality simply does not
have the financial wherewithal to service its debts. Regardless of why the
government finds itself in financial distress, the financial distress can make
it impossible for the government to fulfill its core mission. If the
municipality were powerless to restructure its debt, it would be unable to
provide the basic infrastructure for its citizens. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
But if taxes can only be protected by the authority of the State and the
State can withdraw that authority, the authority to levy a tax is imported
into an obligation to pay an unsecured municipal claim, and there is also
imported the power of the State to modify the means for exercising the
taxing power effectively in order to discharge such obligation, in view of
conditions not contemplated when the claims arose.

. .

. The necessity

compelled by unexpected financial conditions to modify an original
arrangement for discharging a city's debt is implied in every such
obligation for the very reason that thereby the obligation is discharged,
not impaired.
The import of the passage seems to be that those who buy a
municipality's bonds are relying primarily on the municipality's power to
tax in order to have the bond serviced. The power to tax, after all, is almost
always going to be a municipality's primary source of income. The
bondholders know this going into the transaction. The state has the ability
to constrain a municipality's taxing power, and it can deem how the taxes
that a municipality receives are spent. To the extent that the government
cannot both meet its basic needs and service the debt on the terms that it
was issued, the state can create a procedure for the adjustment of the debt.
As the Court said:
56.

Asbury Park, 316 U.S. at 511.
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The intervention of the State in the fiscal affairs of its cities is plainly an
exercise of its essential reserve power to protect the vital interests of its
people by sustaining the public credit and maintaining local government.
The payment of the creditors was the end to be obtained, but it could be
maintained only by saving the resources of the municipality-the goose
which lays its golden eggs, namely, the taxes which alone can meet the
outstanding claims. 57
Put differently, the bondholders' primary expectation is to get paid
back via taxes, and the state can ensure, via a restructuring regime, that a
city maintains sufficient funds to run its operations and service the debt.
Allowing the city to restructure its debt creates the possibility that the

bondholders, while not receiving as much as they were promised, will
receive more than if the city were to not maintain its operations.
The notion that a restructuring of extant debt can enhance the overall

welfare of the bondholders was also crucial in rejecting the dissenting
bondholders' argument that the restructuring regime at issue violated the
Contracts Clause. In rejecting the notion that the bondholders had their
contracts impaired, the Court pointed out that the restructuring made the
creditors as a group better off.5 8 The bonds held by the holdouts were worth
59
more after the restructuring than before.
This observation implies that there are limits on the extent to which a
state can restructure municipal debt. In the extreme, a state could not enact
a law that took away the value of the bondholders' instruments. In terms of
whether a bondholder was better off, the Court seems to be willing to say
60
that if 85% (which, as noted, was the requirement in New Jersey law)
were in favor of the new terms, that was good enough. Of course, no such
61
limitation exists on Congress's power to restructure municipal debts.
The argument is that the power to tax is essential to the running of a

state. It would be fanciful to propose that a modem state could finance
itself without resorting to this power. The power to restructure debt is
linked to the taxing power. Once the state allows a municipality to issue

debt, the primary (if not the only) way that the debt will be serviced is
through the exercise of the taxing power. There are, as the Court noted,
57.
58.

Id at 512.
Id. at 513-14.

59.

Id. at 513. Courts have articulated this logic in other restructuring cases as well. See, e.g.,

Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876-77 (Del. Ch. 1986).
60. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. at 504.
61.
The Contracts Clause applies only to states, not to the federal government. See U.S. CONST.
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing
art. 1, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall . .
the Obligation of Contracts .... ).
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practical limits on how much revenue taxes can raise. Moreover, the
municipality has to be able to meet the basic needs for which it exists in the
first instance. When feasible revenues cannot cover both the basic needs
and the debt obligations, the state needs to have the power to orchestrate an
adjustment in the debt burden.
Indeed, a moment's reflection reveals that a debt restructuring regime
is part and parcel of issuing debt, at least where a sovereign is concerned.
Despite the best efforts of those charged with running the municipality, it is
inevitably the case that a debtor will, on occasion, find itself in a position
where it cannot satisfy all its obligations. Even putting aside the public
choice dynamics that induce governments to worry more about the near
term than the long term, 62 foresight is not perfect. Anticipated growth in
revenues does not always materialize. Investments in new infrastructure
may not yield the expected return. There may be an economic downturn
that causes tax revenue to decline well below previous projections. A city
can see its tax base erode with the loss of a major employer. A government
utility can be whipsawed by rising commodity prices. There are countless
ways in which things may go awry, and the municipality may be left with a
debt stock that it cannot service. If, in such a situation, there is no
restructuring mechanism to which the municipality can turn, then what one
ends up with is chaos. At some point the municipality stops paying, and
then the creditors begin fighting amongst themselves and with the debtor to
grab assets-at least to the extent that the municipality does not enjoy
sovereign immunity. Such a system has little to commend it. It thus is not
surprising that the Supreme Court held that a government's power to issue
debt includes the power to restructure that debt when necessary.
Now, with private firms, we could imagine a world without a debt
restructuring mechanism. If the parties cannot reach an agreement to
restructure the debt, and the business can no longer service it, the firm can
be liquidated. Indeed, liquidation is the most common outcome when a
business cannot make ends meet. Alternatively, the firm can have a capital
structure that itself is designed to deal with future financial distress. One
can imagine a system where the default on a debt payment leads to the
wiping out of old equity and conversion of the junior-most debt into new
equity.63

Such options do not exist with a municipality. Liquidation is by and

62.
See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 53, at 1198-99.
63.
See generally Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993).
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large out of the question. To be sure, states have at times terminated
municipalities in order for the state to take over regulation of the affected
citizenry.6 4 Yet there has never been a case where the body that issued the
debt was liquidated for the benefit of the creditors. Taking over an
operation is one thing; shutting down and selling off its assets and leaving
the affected citizens without services is quite another. At a fundamental
level, the municipal corporation needs to continue in existence so as to
fulfill its public purpose. In this respect, a government is better analogized
to an individual than to a corporation. 65
Revamping the capital structure of the distressed municipality so as to
transfer control rights over its operations is also not an available option.
Proposals in the private sector that call for the elimination of the interests
of equity holders and a conversion of junior debt into new equity when
financial distress hits in effect cede control of the company to the creditors.
Such is not feasible in the case of a government. We have no objections
when one group of financial investors-equity holders-is replaced by
another group-debt holders. One cannot imagine, however, voters losing
their ability to run the government and having the operations taken over by
bondholders. 66 Hedge funds can run companies; our democratic system
does not countenance them running cities.
That a state has the inherent power to put a restructuring regime for
municipal debt in place does not imply that it has an obligation to do so. In
theory, one could articulate a cogent reason as to why a state, when it
establishes a municipal entity, may bar that entity from restructuring its
debts. One could posit that those creating a new entity could decide that
they want to ensure that the new public entity keeps its borrowing
extremely low and funds almost all of its expenditures out of current
income (taxes). For example, a state may be concerned about maintaining
the creditworthiness of the state as a whole, and therefore want to constrain
any individual entity from over-borrowing and therefore putting the credit
64.

See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364 (2012).

65.
See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Integratinga Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159 (2004).
66.
Of course, we do see voters losing control when a financial control is put in place, as was
done in Detroit, New York City, Washington, D.C. and now Puerto Rico. These boards were always put
in place by governmental officials, with a mandate to steer the finances back on track. They were not
charged with looking after the interests of the bondholders first and foremost. See, e.g., Hazel Bradford,
Detroit, D.C. Offer Clues to the Future of Puerto Rico 's Public Pension Funds, PENSIONS & INV. (July

8, 2016, 11:50 A.M.), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160708/ONLINE/160709915/detroit-dc-offerclues-to-the-future-of-puerto-ricos-public-pension-funds; Janell Ross & Matt Sledge, Detroit Financial
Advisory Board Finds Model in New York City, Washington D.C., HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2012,
8:17 A.M.), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/09/detroit-financial-rescuen_ 1409112.html.
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of the other constituent units at risk. The state, in other words, may be
concerned about moral hazard. This decision though, the Supreme Court
has made clear, is a matter for the states-it is a matter of state sovereignty.
To be sure, the federal government has preempted states' power to create a
restructuring regime, but it has put an adequate substitute in its place. The
federal government provides a mechanism, Chapter 9, and the states get to
decide whether they want to use it for their municipalities and, if so,
whether there are conditions they wish to attach to its use.
Consistent with the foregoing, Asbury Park established that it is the
states that have the inherent power to enact a restructuring regime.
Congress, however, reacted to the decision by amending the federal
municipal bankruptcy law so that it preempted state restructuring regimes
such as the one at issue in the case. But Congress did so by saying that it
was giving states the basic mechanism to use, should they wish to use it.
The option-whether or not to have a restructuring mechanism at all-still
rested squarely with the state.
To the extent that the power to establish a restructuring regime is an
integral part of the power to tax, the question becomes whether Congress
can take away this power and put nothing in its place. For the reasons that
articulated above, the answer is no.
III. PUERTO RICO
The above section argued that the power to enact a debt adjustment
scheme is an integral part of a state's sovereign power, and that Congress
cannot take that power away and put nothing in its place.67 But Puerto Rico
is not a state; rather, it has a unique and convoluted relationship with the
United States. The question necessarily arises whether Congress has greater
latitude with respect to the Commonwealth than it does with the states.
If one considers Puerto Rico a territory, as that term is used in the
United States Constitution, it follows that Congress has plenary power over
the island. The much-discussed Insular Cases made the point clear. 68 There
67.
A somewhat related question is raised by the Court's decision in Franklin. In order to be
eligible for Chapter 9, a state has to authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy. Recall that the
consent of the state was a key factor in Bekins. Can a state decline the offer of Chapter 9 and instead
enact its own debt restructuring regime? We know from Franklin that § 903 would apply to such an
attempt. The difference in this case and the one we are considering is that, as to the states, Congress has
provided the option of using Chapter 9, something that it did not provide for Puerto Rico. In other
words, Congress did not take away the states' power to enact a restructuring regime and give it nothing;
rather, it took away the states' power and said that the only route was the federal one. We think that this
would be within Congress's power.
See generally RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES, supra note 10. See also supra note 12.
68.
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is much to criticize in these cases-particularly the thinly veiled
undercurrents of racism and colonialism. 69 However, they stand for the
proposition that Congress has plenary power with respect to territories,
including (at that time) Puerto Rico. Territories, in short, do not enjoy the
structural protections that federalism grants the states. If the relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico remained as it was in 1922,
there would be no plausible argument that Congress transgressed the
Constitution when it forbade Puerto Rico from enacting an insolvency
regime while at the same time offering no alternative. Of course, if that
relationship had not been altered, it is unclear that there would even be an
issue-territories by and large do not have the power to issue debt.
But the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico has
undergone significant changes since the time of the Insular Cases-to
quote the title of Chim~ne Keitner's article, it has moved "From Conquest
to Consent." 70 Most importantly, Congress in 1950 enacted Public Law
600.71 This law provided "[t]hat, fully recognizing the principle of
government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact
so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a
constitution of their own adoption." 72 Puerto Rico, however, did not have
carte blanche. First, the law required that any constitution approved by the
Puerto Rican people had to create a "republican form of government" and
had to contain a bill of rights. 73 Moreover, Congress retained a veto over
any constitution that Puerto Rico might put forth.74 The constitution would
become effective only with congressional approval. Congress had the
power to reject the proposed constitution in full or to approve it subject to
whatever amendments it deemed necessary. 75
Following the passage of Public Law 600 in 1950, Puerto Rican
officials drafted a constitution. It was approved by the citizens of Puerto
Rico on March 3, 1952, with 82% voting in favor. 76 President Truman then,
on April 22, 1952, submitted the draft constitution to Congress for its

&

69.
See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America's Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L.
POL'Y REV. 57, 71 (2013).
Keitner, supra note 10.
70.
71.
Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government by the People of Puerto

Rico, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of48 U.S.C.).
72. Id.
48 U.S.C. § 73 1(c) (2012).
73.
74. See id. § 731(d).
75.
See id.
76.
Dieter Nolen, Puerto Rico, in 1 ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAS: A DATA HANDBOOK 543, 556
tbl. 2.5b (Dieter Nolen ed., 2005).
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approval,n which occurred by joint resolution (subject to minor changes)
on July 3 of the same year. 78
The precise meaning of the creation of Puerto Rico's constitution in
terms of the relationship between Congress and Puerto Rico has been
contested ever since, and we still do not have a definitive determination.
Shortly after Congress blessed Puerto Rico's constitution, many
government officials represented to the United Nations and elsewhere that
any future changes to Puerto Rico's constitution could only take.place with
the consent of the citizens of Puerto Rico. 79 And this makes sense, because
after the Second World War the United States was a key player in the
creation of a new world order that explicitly disavowed colonialism. For
example, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and associated
resolutions, set forth the right of self-determination of "[a]ll peoples;" a
right by which those peoples were to be able to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." 8 0 In 1945, Puerto Rico was on the United Nations' list of
non-self-governing territories under the control of the United States (that is,
the list of imperial colonies). In 1952, based on U.S. representations to the
United Nations about the change in Puerto Rico's status vis-a-vis the
United States, it was taken off that list.81 In other words, Puerto Rico was
part of the United States, and its status could no longer be that of a vassal
state (to remind ourselves, 1950 was when Public Law 600, which
established the "compact" between the United States and Puerto Rico, was
passed8 2).

The following pronouncements from key congressional committees
are illustrative of the rationale behind Public Law 600. The House
Committee on Public Lands explained that Public Law 600 would "fulfill
in a most exemplary fashion our obligations with respect to Puerto Rico
under chapter XI of the charter of the United Nations, relating to the

77.

See 98 CONG. REC. 4228 (1952) (message from Pres. Truman).

78.

See Joint Resolution Approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Pub.

L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952).
79.

See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and

Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 19, 33 n.76, 41 n.105 (1994).
80. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66 (Dec. 14, 1960). See also G.A. Res. 2878 (XXVI), at 16 (Dec.
20, 1971); G.A. Res. 2621 (XXV), at 2 (Oct. 13, 1970).
81.
See Keitner, supra note 10, at 90-91.
82.
We have drawn on Keitner's superb article, for the sources and substance described here. See
generally id.
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administration of non-self-governing territories." 83
The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, for its part, in
its report on Public Law 600 explained that:
[Public Law 600] is designed to complete the full measure of local selfgovernment in the island by enabling the 2% million American citizens
there to express their will and to create their own territorial
government.... [thereby] giv[ing] further concrete expression to our
fundamental principles of government of, by, and for the people. 84
The report cited the obligation to develop self-government contained in
Article 73 of the U.N. Charter and expressed the view that the United
States' Charter obligations towards Puerto Rico "already have been
fulfilled to an extent that is almost without parallel." 85
The foregoing is bolstered by the statement made by Frances Bolton, a
U.S. congressional representative to the U.N. General Assembly's eighth
regular session, who said that "[t]he previous status of Puerto Rico was that
of a territory subject to the full authority of the Congress of the United
States . . . . [but that a new status has been created by] a compact of a

bilateral nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent."86
In addition, as Judge Juan Torruella of the First Circuit has
emphasized, there exist international human rights treaties to which the
United States is party that would be flatly inconsistent with a colony-type
relationship between Congress and Puerto Rico. 87
Putting the foregoing actions and statements together leads to the
conclusion that Congress vested Puerto Rico with sovereignty somewhat on
par with that of the states. Congress could override the Puerto Rican
constitution by passing an inconsistent law, just as it could override a
state's duly enacted law. But it lacks the power to unilaterally amend the

83.
84.
85.

See H.R. REP. No. 81-2275, at 2 (1950).
See S. REP. No. 81-1779, at 2 (1950).
Id. at 3.

86.

See November 3 Statement by Mrs. Bolton, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 802, 804 (1953). See also

October 30 Statement by Mrs. Bolton, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL. 797, 798 (1953); Memorandum by the
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information
Under Article 73(e) of the Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 28 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 585, 586-88 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Memorandum].
87. See Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 173-75 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting); Torruella, supra note 13, at 333-35. See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced
Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2017) (describing the anti-colonial move in international
law); Cesar A. Lopez Morales, A Political Solution to Puerto Rico 's Disenfranchisement:
Reconsidering Congress's Role in Bringing Equality to America 's Long-Forgotten Citizens, 32 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 185, 194-95 (2014).
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Puerto Rican constitution. The Puerto Rican constitution provided a
mechanism for amendment-a mechanism that involved actions only by
Puerto Rico itself.
If anything, though not essential to our argument here, Puerto Rico
should have greater protection from congressional inroads than do the
states. When the Supreme Court got out of the "core function" game in
Garcia, part of its articulated reason was the that the states, through their
representation in Congress, had structural measures by which they could
protect themselves.8 8 Each state has at least one representative. While the
power of a lone representative is not great (though Puerto Rico, were it a
state, would be entitled to four representatives), each state also receives two
senators. As with every small state, even the senators and representatives
working together cannot ensure that a state gets its way. Rather, it is the
case that these congressional officials offer some guarantee that the
interests of the state will be considered in the legislative process. They can
join with others and form coalitions that ensure that they have a voice in
the process. 89 They are not guaranteed to succeed, but they are guaranteed a
seat at the table. Not so for Puerto Rico. It has no representatives that can
look out for its affairs in the political rough-and-tumble in the halls of
Congress. It has to rely on grace, not allies.90 This lack of structural
protection should, if anything, nudge the Court towards intervening to
protect the sovereignty of the Commonwealth when a federal law seeks to
remove power from the island.
The treatment of Puerto Rico's access to Chapter 9 proves the point.
Congress removed Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia from the ambit

88. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 555 (1985).
89. Constitutional law scholars have long debated whether the ability of states to defend their
interests in the political realm implies that there is no need for judicial review to protect the interest of
states. See generally, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); John C. Yoo, The JudicialSafeguards of Federalism, 70
S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Second Death of Federalism, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-i-Vis the States. The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). While the participants in this debate disagree over the
extent to which state interests are protected in the legislative process, and whether this protection means
that there is no need for judicial review, they all acknowledge that states have some protection in the
process-something that Puerto Rico does not have at all.
We have argued elsewhere that this lack of political representation explains the lack of
90.
urgency from the federal government in assisting Puerto Rico after the devastation wrought by
Hurricane Maria in 2017. See Mitu Gulati & Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico: Devastation Without
Representation, HILL (Oct. 22, 2017, 8:00 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/
356455-puerto-rico-devastation-without-representation.
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of Chapter 9 in 1984.91 It is difficult to imagine such action being taken if
Puerto Rico had voting representation in Congress. Its representatives
could have lobbied their fellow representatives and could well have put
together a coalition to block the measure. There does not seem to have been
a great groundswell of enthusiasm for removing the availability of Chapter
9 for Puerto Rico's municipalities; a small bit of organized resistance might
well have stopped the effort.
One can find other statements around the creation of the Puerto Rican
constitution, however, suggesting that at least some thought that Congress
retained plenary power over Puerto Rico, undiminished in any way. 92
These statements, if credited, suggest that the act of creating the
constitution was simply a way to put a process in place by which Puerto
Rico could govern itself, though it would always be subject to overrule by
the federal government. 93 One reason why this debate remains unresolved
is that Congress has not made any attempt to unilaterally alter the Puerto
Rican constitution since giving its consent in 1952.
Moreover, as Gary Lawson and Robert Sloane have pointed out, if
Puerto Rico remains a territory, many features of the current arrangement
would likely be unconstitutional. 94 Most prominently, the official in charge
of Puerto Rico would seem to be an officer of the United States. 95 As such,
he would have to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. 96 In fact, the governor of Puerto Rico, like the governor of every
state in the Union, is elected by the citizenry. 97
In 2016, a few weeks before its decision in Franklin, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that Puerto Rico is not the same for all constitutional
purposes as a state. In PuertoRico v. Scinchez Valle, Puerto Rico had filed a
criminal action against Luiz Sdnchez Valle for illegally selling firearms in
violation of the Puerto Rico Arms Act of 2000.98 The federal government
then brought federal charges against him based on the same conduct. The
91.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

92.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 81-1779, at 3 (1950) ("The measure [Pub. L. 600] would not change

Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic relationship to the United States."); H.R.

Rep. No. 81-2275, at 3.
93.
See Keitner, supra note 10, at 85 ("Because Congress would always have the last word on
Puerto Rico's status, the legacy of conquest circumscribed the principle of consent both structurally and

symbolically.").
94.
See generally Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionalityof Decolonization by
Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico's Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1123 (2009).

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1167-68.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1147.
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1865 (2016).

SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

2017]

155

defendant reached a plea agreement with the federal authorities while the
case brought by Puerto Rican officials was still pending. 99 Sdnchez Valle
then moved to dismiss the case brought by the Puerto Rican authorities,
arguing that convicting him would expose him to double jeopardy, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 0 0
Puerto Rico attempted to continue its prosecution by invoking the dual
sovereign doctrine. 0 1 Under the dual sovereign doctrine, the federal
government and the appropriate state government can prosecute an
individual for the same activity and not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.1 02 The theory is that while the act is the same, the crimes are
distinct -one is against the federal sovereign, and one is against the state
sovereign. Puerto Rico argued here that one crime was against the federal
sovereign, and one was against Puerto Rico. The Court rejected this
argument and held that the Commonwealth could not maintain a separate
prosecution.1

03

The Court recognized that, in the dual sovereign context,
"'sovereignty' . . . does not bear its ordinary meaning." 04 Rather, the
Court's jurisprudence on the dual sovereign issue requires it to look to the
source of the power to criminalize. To the extent that the power to
criminalize comes from distinct sources, the two prosecutions can go
forward. 05 With states and Indian tribes, they have that power apart from
the federal government.1 06 Their sovereignty preexists that of the federal
government. In Puerto Rico's case, however, the power to enact criminal
laws was given to it by the federal government. Congress authorized Puerto
Rico to adopt its constitution, and the prosecution at issue derives its
legitimacy from that constitution. Since the ultimate source of the power
was the federal government, such power could not originate from Puerto
Rico.1

07

The Court's analysis supports our argument. The Court went out of its
way to emphasize that the Commonwealth enjoyed many if not all

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 1869.
Id. at 1869.
Id. at 1871.
Id. at 1876-77.
Id. at 1870.
Id. at 1871.
Id at 1872.
Id. at 1875.
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attributes of sovereignty. 0 8 What was critical to the double jeopardy
analysis was the historical source of that sovereignty: from where did
Puerto Rico get the power to enact its criminal laws? After the Insular
Cases, it was clear that all power lay with Congress. Whatever power
Congress transferred to Puerto Rico, even if this power was a one-way
transfer of sovereignty, it remained the case that this power originated with
the federal government. That being the case, the dual sovereign doctrine
did not apply, and Puerto Rico could not maintain its action against
Sanchez Valle. This analysis is consistent with an understanding of Puerto
Rico's current sovereignty as-once transferred by Congress-including
the attributes of state sovereignty involving the power to issue and
restructure debt.
The real question, left untouched by Sinchez Valle, is whether, having
transferred sovereignty to Puerto Rico by authorizing its constitution,
Congress may subsequently diminish or retract specific aspects of the
conferred sovereignty in ways that it cannot for the states. One can infer
that the Supreme Court is aware of this issue from its repeated efforts at
ducking it. For example, in Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, the issue was whether a Puerto Rico law
violated the Constitution's guarantee of Equal Protection (it did).1 09 But
there are two routes by which the Equal Protection Clause can apply. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause by its terms
applies to states.1 0 To the extent that one views the Commonwealth as a
new type of entity, somewhere between a territory and a state, it may well
be akin to a state for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. On the other hand,
for territories like the District of Columbia, the Equal Protection constraint
on government action applies via the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The Court expressly declined to identify which clause was at issue,
noting that the law in question would run afoul of either. '1

108.
Id. at 1874 ("Puerto Rico today has a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a selfgoverning Commonwealth."); id. ("[The drafting and passage of Puerto Rico's constitution] were of
great significance - and, indeed, made Puerto Rico 'sovereign' in one commonly understood sense of
that term. As this Court has recognized, Congress in 1952 'relinquished its control over [the
Commonwealth's] local affairs[,] granting Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that
possessed by the States."') (quoting Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de

Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 597 (1976)). See also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8
(1982) ("Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled

by the Constitution' ....
) (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 673
(1974)).
109. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 600-01.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Ill. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 at 600.

2017]1

SO VEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING

157

Similarly, the Court has never addressed whether the Contracts
Clause, which applies only to states, applies to Puerto Rico as well.12 In
Sanchez Valle, the Court noted that since both parties agreed that the
Double Jeopardy Clause applied to Puerto Rico, it was not going to
consider the question." 3 Indeed, if Puerto Rico were to be treated as a state
for part of the Constitution other than the idiosyncratic dual sovereign
doctrine, it would appear that treating Puerto Rico differently than states
would be unconstitutional. The Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To . . . establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.""1 4 Congress cannot pass one set of bankruptcy laws for
municipalities in Illinois and a different set for those in California. By the
same token, to the extent that Puerto Rico is part of the United States, the
exclusion of Puerto Rico from the protections of Chapter 9 runs afoul of the
uniformity requirement.
We want to emphasize that our analysis does not rest solely on the fact
that Puerto Rico's citizens voted for a constitution. In the nineteenth.
century, many United States territories enacted constitutions."' While.
these constitutions may have held sway over the local citizens, no one
thought that they altered the territory's relationship with the federal
government. Indeed, it would be odd to argue that any political entity could
act unilaterally and in so doing claim for itself power that otherwise rests in
Congress.
Rather, our argument focuses on the role of Congress in the creation.
Puerto Rico was invited by Congress to draft a constitution. Indeed,
Congress required that the Puerto Rican constitution guarantee a republican
form of government. The U.S. Constitution, of course, requires the United
States (interpreted by the Court to mean Congress)'1 6 to guarantee that all
states have such a form of government. There is no such requirement that
Congress ensure republican government in the territories." 7 Congress's

112.
The First Circuit applied the Contracts Clause to Puerto Rico in United Automobile,
Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America International Union v. Fortuno, 633 F.3d 37,
41 (2011), but a footnote states that the Puerto Rican government conceded that the Contracts Clause

applied to it. Id. at n.3.
113. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1870 n.1.
114.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
115.
See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 154 (2004).

116.
117.

See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ("[The Court] has pointed out that Congress is not

required to establish republican government in the territories before they become States, and before they
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insistence on that requirement in the constitution that it was authorizing
Puerto Rico to adopt is consistent with an investiture of sovereignty similar
to statehood. We view the act "in the nature of a compact," by which
Congress brought the Puerto Rican constitution into being, as the transfer
of sovereignty over the island from Congress to Puerto Rico."

8

International law supports this interpretation. As noted earlier, among
the United States' commitments to the United Nations was that it was
going to divest itself of its colonies. Indeed, as the House and Senate
reports cited earlier suggest, the United States committed to setting an
example for other colonial powers in terms of willingness to grant selfgovernance rights to former colonies such as Puerto Rico.' 19 (Beginning in
1946, the United Nations had viewed the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship as
one in which the latter was a colony. 120) The United States government,
however, represented to the United Nations that the creation of the Puerto
Rican constitution decolonized Puerto Rico.121 These statements would be
inconsistent with the assertion that the United States retained plenary
power over the island. 122
To be sure, some have argued that Congress could not give away any
of its power. For these scholars, the Constitution, when it comes to
relationships with the federal government, contemplates only a limited
number of possibilities.1 23 It is similar to the numerus clausus principle in
property law.1 24 For these scholars, the Constitution identifies and limits
the type of relationships other political units can have vis-a-vis the federal
government. A political unit can be a state, it can be a territory, it can be an
have attained a sufficient population to warrant a popularly elected legislature.") (citing Downes v.

Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278-79 (1901) (dictum)).
118.

Act to Provide for the Organization of a Constitutional Government by the People of Puerto

Rico, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of48 U.S.C.).
The only other territory that has received an equivalent transfer of sovereignty is the Northern Mariana

Islands. See H.R. REP. 104-856, at 2-3 (1996).
119.

See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.

120.

See G.A. Res. 66 (I), at 124-25 (Dec. 14, 1946).

121.
See, e.g., 1953 Memorandum, supra note 86, at 585 (stating that Puerto Rico has achieved
"the full measure of self-government"); id. at 587 ("Congress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have,
under [its] Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect of internal
government and administration.").
122.
These representations to the international community, others have argued, have legal
implications. See Lawson & Sloane, supra note 94, at 1155 ("[I]t is well established that a State may,
by repeated, public representations intended to induce reliance on the part of other States . . . bind itself
unilaterally").
See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
123.
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 89-90 (2002); Lawson & Sloane, supra note 94, at I127.
124.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law ofProperty: The

Numerus Clausus Principle, I10 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000).
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Indian tribe, or it can be a foreign nation. That is all that the Constitution
mentions, and that is all that there is. All agree that Puerto Rico is not a
state, an Indian tribe, or a foreign nation; ergo, it must be a territory. To the
extent that one finds this argument persuasive-and we do not-it ends the
inquiry. Congress would have plenary power over Puerto Rico, and it could
not object to Congress both barring it from enacting an insolvency regime
and at the same time putting nothing in its place.
Yet another reading of the United States Constitution, however, is
possible-and we think more plausible in the modem era. Congress began
with plenary power over the territory. The act of working with the citizens
of Puerto Rico to create a constitution was akin to an Ackermanian
constitutional moment. 125 It was a fundamental alteration in the relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico. By putting in place a
mechanism, in the nature of a compact, that led to the establishment of the
Constitution, Congress ceded part of its former plenary power to the
citizens of Puerto Rico. Consistent with the commitment of the United
States to a world that had put the legacy of colonialism behind it, there
were to be no more colonies with second-class status. The original states
began with total sovereignty and ceded some of that to create the federal
government. Here, the process is the converse. Congress started with total
sovereignty and then transferred some to Puerto Rico.
The Constitution directs that Congress may add new states into the
Union, 26, and when those new states arise from former territories, then
Congress is in effect transferring sovereignty that it once held to the new
states. Those new states then gain new status under the Constitution,
including the protection of their sovereignty from incursion by Congress
under the Tenth Amendment. What happened to Puerto Rico in 1952
represents a portion of that process having occurred. While not ending in
full statehood, it involved a constitutional change in status and a profound
alteration of relationship between the federal government and Puerto Rico.
Sovereignty once yielded, particularly though an agreement to share
governance, cannot be clawed back through unilateral action.
Since 1952, Congress has maintained a relationship with Puerto Rico

125. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). Of course, one does not have to ascribe to this particular vision of constitutional
law to endorse the proposition that Congress is free to create types of entities in addition to those
expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Any version of a living Constitution will suffice. Indeed, even
an originalist could agree with our point, so long as she did not find in the Constitution an intent to limit
congressional flexibility on this score.
126.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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similar to what it has with the states. Federal laws applicable to the nation
can override local laws, as with all states. But Congress has not used its
powers to legislate for Puerto Rico specifically. That power was ceded to
the Puerto Rican government.
To the extent that Congress did irrevocably transfer sovereignty to
Puerto Rico, it is beyond peradventure that part of what was transferred
was the ability to tax its own citizens. Article six of the Puerto Rican
constitution, which, again, was approved by Congress, expressly provides
that the legislature can levy taxes. As per Asbury Park, the power to tax
contains the power to create a debt restructuring scheme. If Congress
cannot prevent a state from enacting a restructuring regime without
offering an alternative, the same is true in the case of Puerto Rico.1 2 7
CONCLUSION
Puerto Rico has operated since 1952 in an uncomfortable place in our
federal system. It is not a state, yet to call it a territory would be to ignore
the combined efforts of Puerto Rico and the United States to remove its
colonial status. Puerto Rico, it seems to us, may not have the structural
protections of the fifty states, but it does have a degree of sovereignty
unlike that of a colony or a territory. To quote President Truman's message
to Congress on the new relationship between Puerto Rico and the United
States, issued while submitting the Puerto Rican draft constitution for
congressional approval:
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be a government which is truly
by the consent of the governed. No government can be invested with a
higher dignity and greater worth than one based upon the principle of
consent. The people of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico
are entering into a new relationship that will serve as an inspiration to all
28
who love freedom and hate tyranny.1
That modicum of inherent power that was granted to Puerto Rico
includes the power to tax and, with that, the power to enact its own
restructuring scheme for its municipalities. Congress can take that power
away so long as it provides an alternative. It cannot, however, consign
127.
At a minimum, this implies that when Congress created the netherworld, it should have done
so with greater clarity. It clearly was not inadvertent that Congress removed Puerto Rico from the
definitional section. Given that there is no evidence whatsoever behind this action, it is impossible to
know whether Congress thought that it was leaving Puerto Rico defenseless. At a minimum, given the
quasi-state-like status that Puerto Rico has today, the Court should require Congress to speak clearly
when it wants to treat Puerto Rico worse than a state. It should not be allowed to invade the traditional
government functions without a clear indication that that was its intent.
128.
See 98 CONG. REC. 4228 (1952) (message from Pres. Truman).
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Puerto Rico to the netherworld.
Indeed, to the extent that states can enact their own restructuring

regimes, Puerto Rico is free to do so as well.
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